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In April 2013, based on reviews by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Com-
mission announced a two-year ban on the use of three insecticides in the neonicotinoid group on 
certain flowering crops, as well as on certain crops that are not attractive to bees at certain times 
of the year.
Although there was strong lobbying against the proposed ban by the multinational chemical com-
panies that produce the insecticides, along with farmer’s groups, strong lobbying in support of 
the ban came from environmental groups, beekeeping organizations and the general public. Even 
after two rounds of voting, the European parliament did not reach a consensus, forcing the Eu-
ropean Commission to exercise its rights and impose the ban – based especially on the evidence 
presented in a review of relevant scientific data produced by the European Union’s own European 
Food Safety Authority. Various reports suggest that, on the one hand, some European govern-
ments were persuaded to support the position of the multinational chemical companies rather 
than be persuaded by the review of research data, while on the other hand, environmental groups 
over-played the risks posed by the insecticides in question and the potential benefits of the pro-
posed ban.
This case study report briefly reviews the background data on recent reported declines in bee 
populations; cites some of the evidence put forward by EFSA and others in support of and against 
the ban; reports on the process of the legislation as it proceeded through the European parliament 
as well as the lobbying that went on during the votes, including an analysis of the roles of key play-
ers and commentators; and proposes a way forward to resolve the apparent dichotomy between 
the pesticide producers and those who support the ban.
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The quote “If the bee disappeared off the face of the earth, 
man would only have four years left to live” is often attributed 
(but almost certainly erroneously) to Albert Einstein.
No matter who said it, the truth is that about a third of the 
food we eat, including beans, brassicas such as cabbage 
or broccoli, tomatoes, apples and strawberries, rely either 
directly or indirectly on insect pollination. (The exceptions 
include cereals such as maize, rice and wheat).
1. ThE inSEcTS
Scientists have identified some 7,000 species of bee, just about 
all of them important pollinators of one plant or another. The 
recent debate in Europe, however, has focused (sometimes 
without distinction) on two main types: the domesticated 
European honey bee (Apis mellifera) and bumblebees 
(belonging to the genus Bombus, of which about 250 species 
are known worldwide).
The plight of the European honey bee (which was first 
introduced into America in 1622, with subsequent additional 
introductions) has been the focus of many studies since 
colony collapse disorder (CCD) was first identified in the 
winter of 2006-07 and described in 2009 (vanEngelsdorp et al., 
2009). In that study, the working definition of CCD included, 
among other indicators, the rapid loss of adult worker 
bees from affected colonies, as evidenced by weak or dead 
colonies with excess brood populations relative to the adult 
bee population, as well as a noticeable lack of dead worker 
bees both within and surrounding the affected hives. Since 
the winter of 2006-07, the Bee Informed Partnership, in 
collaboration with the Apiary Inspectors of America and the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), now keeps 
annual statistics on the overwintering survival of honey bee 
colonies across the United States. According to the latest 
figures, 31.1% of managed honey bee colonies in the United 
States were lost during the winter of 2012-13, a figure similar 
to the six-year average of 30.5% (vanEngelsdorp et al., 2013). 
The cause of CCD has yet to be determined, but it is likely that 
a number of compounding factors are involved (Williams et 
al., 2010). Scientists in Italy, for example, have demonstrated 
that the presence of the parasitic mite, Varroa destructor, in 
honey bee colonies can induce the normally benign deformed 
wing virus (DWV) into what they describe as a “rapidly 
replicating killer” (Nazzi et al., 2012: 1-2). However, in a 
study carried out in France, neonicotinoid insecticides have 
also been implicated (Henry et al., 2012). In this case, honey 
bees exposed to one particular neonicotinoid, thiamethoxam, 
showed impaired ability to navigate back to their hives.
The situation regarding bumblebees is a little different. 
Although colonies of this type of bee are marketed for their 
pollinating services (see, for example, Agralan1 and Koppert 
Biological Systems2), bumblebees tend to live wild, making 
their nests in hedgerows and other overgrown areas, and thus 
provide their pollinating services ‘for free’. In fact, Breeze et 
al. (2011) argue that more than 60% of crop pollination in the 
UK is carried out by wild insects such as bumblebees and 
hoverflies. In recent years, however, most likely because of 
the rise in intensive agriculture, populations of many species 
of bumblebee have been declining across Europe (Robinson & 
Sutherland, 2002). 
Again in the UK, the apple bumblebee (Bombus pomorum) was 
last seen in 1864; Cullem's bumblebee (Bombus cullumanus) 
in 1941; and, more recently, the short-haired bumblebee 
(Bombus subterraneus) was last seen in 1989 (Buglife3). Indeed, 
across the European Union (EU), farmers are rewarded for 
taking measures that are designed to support populations of 
bumblebees (Carvell et al., 2007). Likewise, in North America, 
other species are disappearing, including the yellowbanded 
bumblebee (Bombus terricola), the rusty patched bumblebee 
(Bombus affinis) and the western bumblebee (Bombus 
occidentalis), while Franklin’s bumblebee (Bombus franklini), 
once found only in southern Oregon and northern California, 
may already be extinct (Xerces Society for Invertebrate 
Conservation4). 
As with honey bees, recent studies have implicated neonicotinoid 
insecticides as potential agents for the loss of bumblebee 
colonies (even if the three recorded British extinctions occurred 
prior to the introduction of neonicotinoid insecticides). A study of 
Bombus terrestris in the UK, for example, showed that exposure to 
imidacloprid (as well as another, non-neonicotinoid insecticide) 
impaired worker foraging and increased worker mortality, 
leading to impaired colony success (Gill et al., 2012). Likewise, 
in another British study, Whitehorn et al. (2012) demonstrated 
that laboratory contamination of colonies with the neonicotinoid 
imidacloprid – at concentrations designed to replicate field levels 
– reduced the number of new queens produced by B. terrestris 
colonies. The authors conclude:
“Our results suggest that trace levels of neonicotinoid pesticides 
can have strong negative consequences for queen production 
by bumblebee colonies under realistic field conditions and that 
this is likely to have a substantial population-level impact. Given 
the scale of use of neonicotinoids, we suggest that they may 
be having a considerable negative impact on wild bumblebee 
populations across the developed world.” (p.351)
1 Agralan, Bumblebees for Pollination: http://www.agralan-growers.co.uk/
bumblebees-for-pollination-12-c.asp.
2 Koppert Biological Systems, Natural Pollination: http://www.koppert.com/
pollination/.
3 Buglife: http://www.buglife.org.uk/.
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2. ThE inSEcTicidES
But what of the neonicotinoid insecticides themselves? First 
used in the late 1990s, neonicotinoids were hailed as having 
very low mammalian toxicity and as being less harmful to 
beneficial insects compared to other widely used pesticides, 
such as those in the carbamate and organophosphate groups. 
There are currently at least seven different neonicotinoid 
insecticides approved for commercial use (Wikipedia5). 
The first commercial neonicotinoid, imidacloprid, was 
developed by Bayer AG6 and, marketed as Gaucho™, has 
since become the most widely used insecticide in the world. 
Like other neonicotinoids, it acts by binding to receptors in 
the insect’s nervous system, thereby affecting the efficient 
transmission of nerve impulses, causing paralysis and 
eventually killing the insect. Along with imidacloprid, the two 
other neonicotinoid insecticides that were the subject of the 
debate in Europe were clothianidin, also produced by Bayer 
AG, and thiamethoxam, produced by Syngenta. Marketed 
as Cruiser®, for example, thiamethoxam seed treatment is 
claimed to be “an innovative, environmentally safe insecticide, 
which provides instant, early-season, broad-spectrum 
pest control, thereby enhancing plant vigour and crop yield 
potential. Seeds treated include corn [maize], cotton, cereals, 
sugar beet, oilseed rape (canola) and rice.” (Syngenta7)
As can be inferred from this statement, such neonicotinoids 
are generally used as seed treatments – a method of 
application that is very precise and thus reduces the amount 
of pesticide dispersed in the environment (in comparison 
with spraying or dusting, for example). As the plant grows, 
the insecticide is absorbed and, as it is water-soluble, it 
becomes systemic, moving to all parts of the plant. Thus, 
the whole plant becomes poisonous to insects that feed on 
it, whether they chew their way through leaves or roots, or 
suck sap directly from the plant’s phloem. In other words, 
crop seedlings are protected from attack during their most 
vulnerable early growth stages.
However, it is both the use as a seed treatment and the 
fact that they are systemic that is creating the controversy 
surrounding these three neonicotinoids. Their systemic 
properties, for example, mean that traces of the pesticides 
are also present in pollen, and thus available to foraging 
bees, while their use at sowing, especially of maize, means 
that they are also susceptible to being dispersed in the 
environment among the dust particles thrown up during 
the planting process (Krupke et al., 2012), again with the 
potential of contaminating flowers that bees would use to 
forage for nectar or pollen.
5 Wikipedia, ‘Neonicotinoids’: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neonicotinoid. 
Accessed 15/6/13
6 Bayer AG: http://www.bayer.com/.
7 Syngenta: http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en/Pages/home.aspx, 
and Syngenta, Cruiser®: http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en/
products-and-innovation/product-brands/seed-care/Pages/cruiser.aspx.
3. EUroPEAn ProcESS
In January 2013, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) – 
the European Union (EU) agency charged with assessing risks 
linked to food and feed safety – published risk assessments 
examining the effects on bees of three neonicotinoids: 
clothianidin, imidacloprid and thiamethoxam (EFSA, 2013a, 
2013b, 2013c). The risk assessments focused on three main 
routes of exposure: exposure from residues in nectar and 
pollen in the flowers of treated plants; exposure from dust 
produced during the sowing of treated seeds or application of 
granules; and exposure from residues in guttation fluid (dew-
like droplets of sap that are exuded by some plants) produced 
by treated plants.
EFSA scientists reviewed some 30 scientific papers, data 
submitted to the EU by the industry when seeking approval 
and registration of the three products, plus other information 
submitted by individual EU Member States. Their conclusion 
was that three substances – imidacloprid, clothianidin 
and thiamethoxam – posed a significant threat to honey 
bees when used on flowering crops. In addition, risks were 
identified through their use on winter cereals and other crops 
that are not attractive to bees, especially through exposure 
to insecticide-laden dust dispersed into the atmosphere at 
sowing.
Based on these reviews, the European Commission proposed 
to restrict the use of the three compounds in question. 
4. PArliAmEnTAry ProcESS
The ban on the three neonicotinoid insecticides was actually 
imposed after a series of two votes. The first vote, taken 
following an expert’s meeting of the Standing Committee on 
the Food Chain and Animal Health on 15 March 2013, resulted 
in a stalemate.
Of the 27 EU Member States, 13 voted in favour of the ban 
(including France, Italy and Slovenia, all of which had national 
bans in place at the time of the vote); nine opposed the ban 
(including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ireland); and 
five others abstained (Britain, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland and 
Germany).
A complex weighting system, whereby more populous 
countries have greater voting powers, meant that the vote 
was inconclusive and thus a second round of voting was 
required. It was during this interim period of about six weeks 
that political lobbying – and interest in the popular press – 
reached its peak. It was also during this period that a number 
of beekeepers and environmental groups in the United States 
filed a lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency for 
its "failure to protect pollinators from dangerous pesticides"8, 
citing especially the two neonicotinoids, clothianidin and 
8 Press release, 21 March 2013: Beekeepers and Public Interest Groups Sue 
EPA Over Bee-Toxic Pesticides: http://www.theorganicview.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/Neonic-Suit-PR-3.21.13.pdf.
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thiamethoxam.
Back in Europe, the second vote, held on 29 April 2013 in the 
European Commission, finished as follows:
•	In favour of the ban: 15 – Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden.
•	Against the ban: 8 – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom.
•	Abstentions: 4 – Finland, Greece, Ireland and Lithuania.
Among the most notable swings during the interim period 
were those of Bulgaria and Germany (from abstention to 
support of the ban); Italy (from supporting the ban to voting 
against the ban); the UK (from abstention to voting against the 
ban); and Ireland (from opposing the ban to abstention). 
Ireland initially opposed the ban, its Minister for Agriculture, 
Simon Coveney, claiming that not only did the ban go beyond 
EFSA’s findings and take the decision-making power away from 
Member States, but that he also had some technical problems 
with the proposed terms of the ban (McDonald, 2013). By the 
time the second vote came around, a spokesperson for the Irish 
government was quoted as saying, “We wanted to allow time 
for further consideration of the scientific evidence and create 
space for a compromise that could have the broad support of 
all Member States” (Cahill, 2013). As that did not prove possible, 
Ireland neither supported nor opposed the ban.
The Italian situation is also rather unusual, especially as Italy has 
had a partial ban – on the use of four neonicotinoids on maize 
seeds – in place from 2008 until 31 January 2013 (Ministero 
della Salute, 2012), subsequently extended to the end of June 
and then the end of December 2013 (Ministero della Salute, 
2013). However, it is thought that the lack of conclusive scientific 
evidence and the pest control needs of many of Italy’s fruit and 
vegetable growers led to their representative opposing the ban.
Again, the weighted voting system meant that the result was 
inconclusive. The European Commission, therefore, decided to 
exercise its rights and impose the ban, basing its decision on the 
evidence presented in the EFSA reviews. The details of the ban 
were subsequently published on 24 May 2013 as Regulation (EU) 
no. 485/2013 (European Commission, 2013).
Under the terms of the ban, as of 1 December 2013, farmers 
will not be able to buy or sow seeds of crops deemed attractive 
to bees and treated with the three insecticides in question for a 
two-year period. The ban extends to certain crops that are not 
attractive to bees at certain times of the year, in particular spring 
cereals. After the two-year period, the EU will review additional 
evidence. The insecticides can, however, still be used on crops 
grown in greenhouses, on winter cereals and other crops not 
attractive to bees, and on field crops after flowering.
5. PArliAmEnTAry PrESSUrES
In the months, weeks and days leading up to both the first and 
second votes, intense lobbying was carried out by interested 
parties on both sides of the debate. On the one side, internet 
activists Avaaz.com raised an online petition calling for the 
ban that eventually garnered the support of 2.6 million 
signatories. Mobilising an alliance of environmental groups, 
beekeepers and others, some 400 people marched on 10 
Downing Street, home of the British prime minister, on 26 
April – three days before the critical vote – and handed in the 
petition along with the results of a poll showing that 71% of UK 
respondents supported the ban. Celebrities Dame Vivienne 
Westwood and Katherine Hamnett led the march and ensured 
major coverage in the press9. 
Prior to the second EU vote, marches were also organized 
in Brussels, Cologne, London and Madrid10 in a deliberate 
attempt to demonstrate to politicians the strength of public 
support for the ban on the controversial insecticides.
But was the public supporting the conclusions reached by 
EFSA based on the scientific evidence available for review? 
Or was the public responding to an emotional appeal from the 
campaign groups? It seems that it was the latter. Lynn Dicks, 
writing in Nature (Dicks, 2013), noted that the Avaaz online 
petition called on people to “save bees from extinction”, 
which she defined as “absurd”. Dicks also noted that the 
UK newspaper, The Guardian, “mangled” evidence she had 
presented to the UK parliament concerning populations of 
other pollinating insect species.
The motives of both the environmental campaign groups and, 
in its own way, the pro-environment Guardian newspaper are 
clear. Indeed, perhaps they should also be commended for 
raising such massive awareness of an environmental issue 
involving insects. Many comparable campaigns have focused 
on the so-called ‘charismatic mega-fauna’, i.e. species such 
as whales, dolphins, elephants, tigers and gorillas. The fact 
that bees pollinate our fruit crops, make honey, and can be 
‘kind of furry’ has obviously been marketed to great emotive 
effect.
Coming back to the scientific evidence, it was Roger Pielke Jr., 
in his book The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy 
and Politics (Pielke, 2007) who made the distinction between:
• the pure scientist, who stays distant from the decision-
making process, making his or her scientific information 
available in a passive way, and is unconcerned with how 
(or even whether) the information is used by policy 
makers;
• the science arbiter, who engages with policy makers, 
serving as a resource and providing answers to factual 
questions that the policy maker may ask, but who does 
9 Press release, 26 April 2013: Hundreds join “March of Beekeepers” on 
Parliament: https://secure.avaaz.org/act/media.php?press_id=421.
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not make any specific recommendations;
• the issue advocate, who does make specific 
recommendations to policy makers, and tries to make a 
case for one alternative over another; and
• the honest broker, who attempts to provide background 
evidence for or against any of the range of decision 
options facing a policy maker, helping to clarify the 
choices available while leaving any actual decision to the 
policy maker, based on their own preferences and values.
As Pielke argued, the honest broker is the ideal case, but in 
practice it is difficult: (a) for policy makers (and others) to 
identify such honest brokers; and (b) for scientists themselves 
to avoid becoming issue advocates once they enter the political 
arena. 
To its credit, it is the role of science arbiter that EFSA plays. 
A review of some of the participants in the UK discussions is 
revealing, however. Dave Goulson of the University of Sussex, 
for example, is a recognized expert on bees and has published 
a significant number of papers (see, for example, Carvell et 
al., 2007, and Whitehorn et al., 2012). He has also appeared in 
interviews with the press, so obviously cannot be considered 
a pure scientist. But is he a science arbiter, issue advocate or 
honest broker?
In many cases, Goulson’s measured views and obvious expertise 
may mark him as an honest broker, but a check of his profile11 
shows that, in 2006, he founded the Bumblebee Conservation 
Trust, a charity devoted to reversing bumblebee declines, and 
that he has written on such subjects as the reintroduction of 
the short-haired bumblebee (B. subterraneus), extinct in the 
UK since the 1980s, from a population that survives from a 
19th century introduction into New Zealand (Goulson, 2013). 
Thus, Goulson could be considered an issue advocate. 
In contrast, Mark Walport, who took over as the UK 
government’s chief scientific adviser in April 2013, certainly 
ought to act as an honest broker. Indeed, in an editorial 
published in the Financial Times immediately prior to the 
European Union’s second vote (Walport, 2013), he wrote that: 
“The job of scientists is to undertake the scientific work and to 
advise politicians on science – and it is to them that we must 
turn for the final decisions”, thus advocating the honest broker 
role. 
He also wrote that the proposed ban was “based on a 
misreading of the currently available evidence” and that: 
“The consequences of such a moratorium could be harmful 
to the continent’s crop production, farming communities and 
consumers,” thus echoing the line taken by the chemical 
companies. In so doing, he went against the recommendations of 
a report from a cross-party House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee. Their report, published a month before 
Walport’s opinion piece, came out heavily in support of the ban 
in the UK and also recommended that the UK’s Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) support such 
11 Goulson, D. http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/126217.
a moratorium at EU level (House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee, 2013).
Against this background, Walport’s comments have led to 
accusations that he has “misinformed the public about the 
scientific method, risk and uncertainty” and that: “He has made 
groundless, unscientific and emotionally manipulative claims. 
He has indulged in scaremongering and wild exaggeration in 
support of the government’s position.” (Monbiot, 2013) 
It should also be noted, however, that George Monbiot himself12 
has written about UK politics and against the growing power 
that corporations are exerting (Monbiot, 2000). In other words, 
Monbiot is certainly an issue advocate.
Another report published between the two EU votes was that of 
the UK’s Food and Environment Research Agency, the scientific 
and advisory agency that operates under the auspices of 
DEFRA (Thompson et al., 2013). The report, which attempted 
to analyse the effects of neonicotinoids on bumblebee colonies 
adjacent to oilseed rape crops, was based on results from 
one season and was “not designed as a definitive statistically 
robust study,” but rather as a “rapid response to concerns 
about the effects of neonicotinoids on bumble bee colonies 
raised by Whitehorn et al. (2012)” (p. 1). As such, it was the first 
field study published in the EU that addressed these concerns. 
Among its results, there was no observed relationship between 
levels of neonicotinoid in colonies and the success of those 
colonies. “The absence of these effects is reassuring but not 
definitive,” (p.36) conclude the authors, who add that: “The 
study underlines the importance of taking care in extrapolating 
laboratory toxicology studies to the field, as well as the great 
need of further studies under natural conditions,” (p.36) 
with the aim, presumably, being to counter the impact of the 
Whitehorn study.
The rush to publication, in March 2013 (i.e. prior to the second 
EU vote), somewhat backfired, however, as the lack of time for 
peer review of the document allowed critics, including EFSA, 
to pick over the results and claim that: “due to the weaknesses 
of the study design and methodology, the study did not allow 
to draw any conclusion on the effects of neonicotinoids on 
exposed bumblebee colonies” (EFSA, 2013d; p.1).
Of course, the two corporations themselves, Bayer AG and 
Syngenta, would be expected to advocate in support of their 
products. An idea of the commercial value of these pesticides 
can be gleaned from the fact that, in 2002, an intellectual 
property dispute between the two companies over 
neonicotinoid chemistry resulted in Syngenta paying Bayer 
some US$120 million for the right to produce thiamethoxam 
(Ong, 2002). At the time, Syngenta was generating annual 
sales of some US$100 million from thiamethoxam-based 
products, with the ambition of achieving sales of up to 
US$400 million per year.
Little wonder, then, that the two companies, along with 
12 Monbiot, G. http://www.monbiot.com/about/.
6 McGrath | p6
Peter F. McGrath Politics meets Science: The case of neonicotinoid insecticides in Europe
industry bodies such as the European Crop Protection 
Association (ECPA), came out fighting in efforts to support 
their products. Among their first shots was a series of letters 
to European commissioners, lobbying for support after the 
French had proposed a unilateral ban in 2012. The letters 
were made available to Corporate European Observatory 
under the European freedom of information legislation 
(Carrington, 2013).
Then, on 14 January 2013 (i.e. prior to the EFSA reports 
published on 16 January), the Humboldt Forum for Food and 
Agriculture (HFFA) published a report supported financially 
by Bayer and Syngenta. The report’s authors analysed various 
scenarios and concluded that banning the neonicotinoids 
would cost between 3.8 and 6.3 billion Euros in lost revenues 
up and down the food production and processing value chain 
(Noleppa & Hanh, 2013). To put this value into context, the 
authors explained that: “The immediate potential damages 
to the overall EU welfare if neonicotinoid seed treatments 
were banned or their use suspended (4.5 billion Euro) are 
approximately as large as the entire agricultural value 
added of some smaller EU member states, e.g. Austria 
or Finland” (p.7). Thus, the two chemical companies were 
appealing directly to the agricultural and food processing 
industries, as well as – naturally – to politicians fearful that 
supporting a ban of the compounds could lead to significant 
job losses.
Additional documents released to Corporate European 
Observatory also reveal that Syngenta tried to influence 
EFSA, particularly in relation to the wording of the press 
release that announced the results of its literature review and 
recommendation that the three neonicotinoid insecticides in 
question be banned pending further investigations. Indeed, 
having failed in their attempt to persuade EFSA to reword 
the initial draft of the press release, Syngenta went on 
(unsuccessfully) to threaten the agency and its director with 
legal action (Pigeon, 2013; Carrington, 2013).
Eventually, having failed to stave off the EU ban, both 
companies naturally continued to make a case for their 
products. Immediately after the second vote, Syngenta chief 
operating officer, John Atkin, said: 
“The European Commission has again failed 
to win the necessary support for its pro-
posed ban on this vital technology. The pro-
posal is based on poor science and ignores a 
wealth of evidence from the field that these 
pesticides do not damage the health of bees. 
Instead of banning these products, the Com-
mission should now take the opportunity to 
address the real reasons for bee health de-
cline: disease, viruses and loss of habitat and 
nutrition.”13
Bayer echoed the fact that the “real issues surrounding bee 
health” were issues such as “the Varroa mite, bee diseases 
and viruses, and the need to provide more nectar-rich habitat,” 
14 while continuing to claim that the ban would restrict farmers’ 
“capability to grow abundant, high-quality, affordable food in 
Europe”.15
Again, Lynn Dicks, in her Nature article (Dicks, 2013), notes 
that: “One headline widely reported in the UK farming press 
is that, without them [neonicotinoid insectides], UK wheat 
yields would decline by up to 20%,” adding that this was a 
“disingenuous interpretation” of the industry-funded report.
Dicks goes on to say that: “As a scientist … I find this 
misinformation deeply frustrating. Yet I also see that the lies 
and exaggeration on both sides are a necessary part of the 
democratic process to trigger rapid policy change.” The crux of 
the matter, claims Dicks, is that: “Politicians respond to public 
opinion much more readily than they respond to science.” 
It could be added: “Especially when the science indicates an 
effect – but is still inconclusive.”
6. PrEcAUTionAry PrinciPlE
The precautionary principle was established at the 1992 Rio 
Conference on the Environment and Development, during 
which the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(United Nations, 1992) was adopted. Principle 15 of the 
declaration states that: “in order to protect the environment, 
the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capability. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.”
Although not enshrined in EU law, a communication from the 
European Commission in 2000 (European Commission, 2000) 
notes that the precautionary principle can be applied when 
“scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined 
with sufficient certainty” (pgh 4). It goes on to state that: “The 
precautionary principle should be maintained so long as 
scientific information is incomplete or inconclusive, and the 
risk is still considered too high to be imposed on society, in 
view of chosen level of protection” (pgh 6) and that: “Measures 
should be periodically reviewed in the light of scientific 
13  Press release. 29 April 2013. EU Member States again fail to agree restriction 
on key crop protection technology. http://www.syngenta.com/global/
corporate/en/news-center/news-releases/Pages/130429.aspx.
14  Press release. 24 May 2013. Decision to restrict use of neonicotinoid-
containing products will not improve bee health. http://www.cropscience.
bayer.com/en/Media/Press-Releases/2013/Decision-to-restrict-use-of-
neonicotinoid-containing-products-will-not-improve-bee-health.aspx.
15  It should be noted also that both companies have, for several years, worked 
with farmers in promoting schemes designed to protect and encourage 
pollinators, Bayer through its Bee Care programme (http://beecare.bayer.




























progress, and amended as necessary” (ibid.).
On this basis, this is exactly what the EC has requested – a 
two-year ban with time to collect additional data followed by a 
thorough review of any new information.
It should be noted, however, that the precautionary principle 
itself has been called into question, with a recent publication by 
the US-based Council for Agricultural Science and Technology 
(CAST; Marchant et al., 2013)  claiming that it is “bias[ed] against 
new technologies” (p.1), predicting that “the precautionary 
principle will become increasingly controversial, marginalized 
and ignored in the future” (ibid.), and also claiming that it “does 
more harm than good” (p.16).
In many ways, the view of the CAST report authors, in the case 
of the neonicotinoid debate, has been re-argued by, among 
others, two experts from the University of Sussex’s Laboratory 
of Apiculture and Social Insects (Carreck & Ratnieks, 2013) 
who maintain that, although both sides of the debate appealed 
to scientific evidence, “that evidence is far from clear cut.” 
Indeed, Carreck and Ratnieks argue that the moratorium on the 
three neoniconinoid insecticides is not necessarily a victory for 
those worried about declining bee populations – especially as 
farmers are likely to revert to using older types of insecticides 
such as synthetic pyrethroids. As with neonicotinoids, the 
sub-lethal effects of this class of insecticides on either honey 
bees or bumblebees is unknown. In addition, note the authors, 
farmers are advised to spray pyrethroids early in the morning 
or late in the afternoon when honey bees are less active, and so 
avoid contact with these vital pollinators. However, bumblebees 
have different activity temperature thresholds and are often 
active early in the morning and late into the evening, and so 
would come into direct contact with such sprays.
Neither does the ban go any way towards unravelling the 
effects of exposure to other agrochemicals such as fungicides. 
As Pettis et al. (2013) describe, honeybees can be exposed 
to cocktails of pesticides. In their US-based study of more 
than 60 hives in seven different crops, pollen collected from 
bees returning to the hive contained an average of nine 
different pesticides (range: 3-21).  In addition, bees fed pollen 
containing the fungicides chlorothanonil and pyraclostrobin 
showed increased susceptibility to the gut parasite, Nosema 
ceranae.  “Our results show the necessity of testing for sub-
lethal effects of pesticides on bees, and advocate for testing 
more broadly than the insecticides that are the targets of most 
current research,” conclude the authors (Pettis et al., 2013: 
p.7).
7. wAy forwArd
It seems that a first major step to resolving such issues is to 
overhaul the whole testing process for the registration of new 
insecticides. This is the view, for example, of Decourtye et al. 
(2013), writing in Nature, who assert that: “The current risk-
assessment process for [synthetic pesticides] is outdated and 
does not incorporate developments from the past 30 years.” 
They also argue that, while current tests evaluate adult 
honey bee survival after a short exposure period, they should 
also be required to determine other effects such as chronic 
toxicity and sub-lethal effects, including on larvae, as well as 
a broader range of exposure scenarios. The debates relating 
to many of the peer-reviewed publications cited above – and 
to whether or not the doses of insecticide received by the bees 
were ‘realistic’ under field conditions – lends weight to the 
recommendation of Decourtye et al. (2013).
Obviously, if such a recommendation were to be implemented 
it would likely add to the cost of research, development and 
registration of new insecticides and, in this case, would be 
resisted by the farming community who would see added costs 
eroding their profit margins. While the agrochemical industry 
could also potentially resist the additional requirements, it 
might appreciate the clarity of any new regulations that would, 
it is hoped, remove any uncertainty on whether approval 
can be obtained for new active ingredients. In other words, 
instead of regulators ‘moving the goalposts‘, new regulations, 
based on sound science, could potentially reduce costs as the 
companies would be able to carry out only those specific tests 
required.
At this point, it is worth looking again at a previous major 
response to an impasse regarding an agricultural technology – 
that of the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops into 
Europe, and into the UK in particular. 
In late 1998, against a background of required checks that had 
been passed, a group of herbicide-tolerant crops, including 
sugar beet, oilseed rape and fodder maize, were due to be 
approved for commercial cultivation. However, there was still 
a weight of public opinion against their release – nourished 
by campaigns from environmental groups and the press (thus 
paralleling the situation with neonicotinoid insecticides). 
Fearing a political backlash, the UK government entered 
into partnership with an industry umbrella body, the Supply 
Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops (SCIMAC), to 
design and implement a major eco-environmental research 
programme aimed at evaluating the safety of the GM crops 
with regard to non-target wildlife including birds and insects.
The so-called Farm Scale Evaluations eventually lasted five 
years, included some 266 field trials around England, Scotland 
and Wales, and cost the UK government some £6 million 
(equivalent to US$9.2 million at today's exchange rate). Hailed 
as the "largest and most thorough [study] of its kind in the world" 
(Burke, 2004: p.2), the trials were carried out by a consortium 
of scientists from independent research institutions led by 
the respected Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, overseen by 
an Independent Scientific Steering Committee, and included 
other checks and controls. In particular, the design of the 
trials was left entirely to the scientists and remained free from 
government, industry and environmental lobby influences 
(Turner, 2004).
The results were published as a collection of eight papers in 
a special issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society (Various, 2003) and the raw data made available on-
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line. “For the first time, [researchers] have information on 
animal and plant numbers, and how different species interact 
with one another. The database gives researchers a baseline 
so they can monitor future changes to farmland wildlife,” 
claimed Burke (2004: p.6).
While it is generally agreed that the trials did answer the 
questions they set out to answer – and that the science was 
sound – there is a feeling that other ecological issues, relating 
to the spread of GM pollen, for example, were not addressed. 
In addition, as Turner (2004; chair of SCIMAC at the time of 
the trials) points out, in any case the press misrepresented 
the results and continued with their headlines predicting 
continued erosion of wildlife populations if the crops were 
commercialised. (In fact, the trials showed the opposite to be 
true for fodder maize).
So where does this leave the neonicotinoids?
As Lord de Mauley, Parliamentary Under Secretary at 
DEFRA, recently pointed out at a Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
conference: “Bees will be vulnerable, whether or not we put 
more restrictions on insecticides. I don’t think anyone would 
disagree that the picture is very much more complex.” (de 
Mauley, 2013)
de Mauley used the FoE platform to announce the launch of an 
“urgent and comprehensive review of current policy, evidence 
and civil society action on pollinators to identify what needs 
to be done”, including developing a better understanding of 
the factors that affect bees, as well as how future actions of 
government, other organisations and individuals can help. 
For example, de Mauley highlighted the fact that the UK 
government was “thinking seriously about how the successor 
to Environmental Stewardship under the new [EU] Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) might increase the benefits for, and 
reduce the pressure on, pollinators” and noted that: 
“This urgent review will form the basis of a 
National Pollinator Strategy, which will bring 
together all the pollinator-friendly initiatives 
already underway and provide an umbrella 
for new action. We will look across different 
causes of bee decline and across different 
bee species and across different insect pol-
linators.”
Of course, as it has been all through the neonicotinoid debate, 
the case for a scientific evaluation was made. “In all of this, we 
must be led by science,” confirmed de Mauley. “As part of the 
review, I have already asked DEFRA’s Chief Scientific Adviser, 
Professor Ian Boyd, to convene a group of independent experts 
to look at the evidence on the state of our pollinators.”
While such a report is welcome, it can only include a review 
of available evidence. As Carreck and Ratneiks (2013) point 
out, one thing that the current scientific literature highlights 
is the need for more research, for example regarding the 
extent of exposure of wild bees to neonicotinoid insecticides. 
Rather pessimistically, they add that: “Even if governments 
can be persuaded to fund such work, it will be hard to design 
a research programme that will find a definitive answer.” They 
also conclude that, without such answers, we will be having the 
same debate in two years time when the current moratorium 
is about to expire.
The GM Field Scale Evaluations have demonstrated that such 
large-scale trials are possible, even if Turner (2004) was 
somewhat pessimistic when he wrote: 
“In view of their costs (both to the UK Gov-
ernment and the technology providers) 
together with the adverse response by the 
environmental campaign groups, and the 
length of time needed to carry out the work, 
it seems unlikely that an exercise of similar 
scale will be undertaken in the near future.” 
(p.224)
Now, some 10 years on, perhaps it is time for governments – 
not just the UK government, but governments across Europe 
– to come together with a body such as the European Crop 
Protection Association (ECPA), that represents the relevant 
industry, as well as environmental lobby groups such as Buglife 
and Friends of the Earth, to appoint a Europe-wide group 
of experts that will not only review available data (as EFSA 
have already done to an extent), but who will also determine 
what additional evidence is needed and then design a robust 
continent-wide experiment that will provide that evidence in 
an open and audited fashion.
Without such a major initiative, it is certainly possible that 
the two-year moratorium could be extended. The fact that 
most European nations have yet to permit the planting of any 
commercial GM crop should provide a stark warning to the 
chemical companies, who must join the research consortium 
proposed above as open and willing partners.
This paper began with a quote. To conclude, therefore, let us 
consider what Oscar Wilde wrote in The Importance of Being 
Earnest: “The truth is rarely pure and never simple.” 
It is true that such a series of Europe-wide trials will not be 
simple (or cheap) to carry out. It is equally true, echoing the Farm 
Scale Evaluations, that the results may apply only to a narrow 
series of questions asked about the effects of neonicotinoids 
and, for example, may not take into account (although they 
should) the effects of using alternative pesticides – not only on 
bees, but also on other non-target organisms.
In fact, the whole debate is much wider and involves issues 
relating to integrated pest management rather than the 
prophylactic treatment that the easy-to-apply neonicotinoids 
have promoted. It also requires major discussions about 
alternative methods of pest control (e.g. biological control and 
GM crops), as well as ecosystem services: how much are they 
‘worth’, and who should be required to pay to protect them? In 



























our agriculture and what we are willing to accept to ensure our 
future food security against a background of ever-increasing 
world population and ever-increasing biodiversity loss.
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